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IMAGES OF THE ARAB WORLD AND MIDDLE EAST—
DEBATES ABOUT DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
MICHAEL FAKHRI∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau 
of Arab States (UNDP RBAS) and the World Bank recently published a 
series of thoroughly researched reports addressing development in the 
Arab/Middle East North Africa (MENA) region.1 Both series of reports 
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1
 The UDNP reports are the following: U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ARAB FUND FOR ECON. AND SOC. 
DEV., ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE 
GENERATIONS (2002) [hereinafter UNDP 2002]; U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ARAB FUND FOR 
ECON. AND SOC. DEV., ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003: BUILDING A KNOWLEDGE 
SOCIETY (2003) [hereinafter UNDP 2003]; U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ARAB FUND FOR ECON. 
AND SOC. DEV., ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: TOWARDS FREEDOM IN THE ARAB 
WORLD (2004) [hereinafter UNDP 2004]; and U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ARAB FUND FOR ECON. 
AND SOC. DEV., ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: TOWARDS THE RISE OF WOMEN IN 
THE ARAB WORLD (2005) [hereinafter UNDP 2005]. The World Bank reports are the following: 
WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, JOBS, GROWTH, AND GOVERNANCE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL FOR PROSPERITY (2003) 
[hereinafter INTEGRATIVE REPORT]; WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, TRADE, 
INVESTMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: ENGAGING THE 
WORLD (2003) [hereinafter TRADE, INVESTMENT]; WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT, BETTER GOVERNANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: 
ENHANCING INCLUSIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2003) [hereinafter BETTER GOVERNANCE]; 
WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2004) [hereinafter GENDER]; and 
WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, UNLOCKING THE EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (2004) [hereinafter 
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were written for a broad, non-specialist audience and have garnered 
significant public attention.2 Despite the popularity of the reports, to date, 
they have received little critical attention by legal scholars.3 
The two organizations’ reports examine similar development 
topics and target similar popular audiences. Although each set of reports 
employs prevalent theories of development, each uses a different 
definition of development. The UNDP RBAS reports’ conception of 
development focuses on enlarging choices and enhancing human 
freedom. The World Bank reports’ conception of development 
emphasizes economic growth and good governance. 
Both the UNDP RBAS and World Bank reports consider 
regional integration amongst Arab/MENA states to be one of the primary 
means of achieving development. Indeed, in the past two decades, a 
plethora of regional trade agreements have been discussed in numerous 
books and articles;4 as such, these debates can be situated amongst the 
broader discussions regarding regional trade agreements. The popularity 
of regional trade agreements was evidenced most recently when the 
member countries of the G8 issued a statement emphasizing that they 
will put more effort into negotiating regional and bilateral trade 
agreements and, in effect, reduce their efforts in concluding multilateral 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization under the Doha 
Development Round.5 
Moreover, the reports’ look to regional institutions is not 
surprising because the Arab world/MENA region’s post-World War II 
history is laden with multiple attempts of regional integration in 
                                                          
EMPLOYMENT]. Pinpoint references to these reports in this article are not exhaustive and are 
meant to exemplify certain characteristics in the respective reports. 
 
2
 Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, U.N. Assistant Sec’y Gen., Dir., Reg’l Bureau for Arab States at U.N. 
Dev. Programme, How Were the Arab Peoples Betrayed? Findings of the UNDP Arab Human 
Development Reports, Speech before the Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar at MIT (Mar. 14, 
2006) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter UNDP Speech]; and Mustapha Nabli, World Bank 
Chief Economist for the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank Development Reports on the 
MENA Region, Speech at World Bank and MEDEA Institute (Feb. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.medea.be/index.html?doc=1630 [hereinafter World Bank Speech]. 
 
3
 One notable exception is Michael Trebilcock, Between Institutions and Culture: The UNDP’s 
Arab Human Development Reports, 2002–2005, 1 MIDDLE EAST L. & GOVERNANCE 210 
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1131309. 
 
4
 See Bryan Mercurio, Regional Trade Agreements: Law, Policy and Practice by David Gantz, 9 
WORLD TRADE REV. 412, 412 (2010). 
 
5
 Group of Eight, G8 Muskoka Declaration Recovery and New Beginnings, ¶ 26 (2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/g8_muskoka_declaration.pdf. 
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divergent forms.6 Since each series of reports has a different definition of 
development, each prescribes regional integration for different reasons. 
The UNDP RBAS reports prescribe regional integration in order to 
empower ordinary people, enhance human freedom, and strengthen Arab 
identity. The World Bank reports prescribe regional integration in order 
to achieve economic growth from trade liberalization and to ensure 
national governments achieve standards of good governance. 
The reports by the two organizations, each with its own 
definition of development, present a juncture in the character of future 
trade agreements and regional integration that is actually part of the 
ongoing broader globalization and development debate.7 In fact, the 
World Bank and the UNDP have and will continue to significantly 
influence general development discourse.8 This means that policy-makers 
                                                          
 
6
 Rania S. Miniesy et al., Intra-regional Trade Integration in the Middle East: Past Performance 
and Future Potential, in TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
AND NORTH AFRICA: ECONOMIC BOUNDARIES IN FLUX 41, 42–3 (Hassan Hakimian & Jeffrey B. 
Nugent eds., 2004); Samiha Fawzi, The Economics and Politics of Arab Economic Integration, 
in ARAB ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: BETWEEN HOPE AND REALITY 13 (Ahmed Galal & Bernard 
Hoekman eds., 2003); see MUNZER FAYEK ANABTAWI, ARAB UNITY IN TERMS OF LAW 53 
(1963); and ALFRED G. MUSREY, AN ARAB COMMON MARKET: A STUDY IN INTER-ARAB 
RELATIONS, 1920–1967 3 (1969). For an assessment of different contemporary regional 
integration projects, see Tomer Broude, Regional Economic Integration in the Middle East and 
North Africa: A Primer, in 1 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 269 
(Jörg Philipp Herrman & Christoph Terhechte eds., 2010). 
 
7
 For information on the close link between the recent “development” debate and the 
“globalization” debate, see, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (Alfred A. Knopf 
1999) (1999); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND THE POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 19 (Ben 
Fine, Costas Lapavitsas & Jonathan Pincus eds., 2003); RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 
(Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003); MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS (2004); 
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 52 (2004); JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF 
POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME (2005); DAVID ELLERMAN, HELPING 
PEOPLE HELP THEMSELVES: FROM THE WORLD BANK TO AN ALTERNATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (2005); and THE NEW DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: AFTER THE 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 47 (Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Ben Fine eds., 2006). For arguments 
regarding fundamental problems with the word “development” and its conceptualization, see, 
e.g., DEVELOPMENT AND ITS RATIONALITIES: PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE 
CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT (C.A. van Peursen & M.C. Doeser eds.,1985); THE DEVELOPMENT 
DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER vi–vii (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 2d ed. 2010); 
and CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NEW PARADIGM (Ronaldo Munck 
& Denis O’Hearn eds., 1999). 
 
8
 See, e.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking The Rule Of Law In Post-Conflict Rebuilding: A 
Critical Examination, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1347, 1370–71 (2008); Robert B. Zoellick, 
World Bank Group Pres., Speech at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. (Oct. 10, 2007), 
14 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 243, 252 (2008). Countries in Africa were at a similar juncture in the 
1980s. Two primary reports addressed development and regional integration. “The 1980 Lagos 
Plan of Action prepared by African governments under the auspices of the OAU [Organization 
of African Unity] and the UN Economic Commission on Africa, identified external economic 
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in the region will likely determine a vision of development and regional 
integration influenced by either one or both reports. 
The aim of this article is to better understand each international 
organization’s respective definition of development. This article will 
examine how each series of reports operationalizes its concept of 
development through the prescription for regional integration. This 
approach explicates the geographic assumptions and institutional 
implications that underlie each concept of development.9 The benefits of 
this approach are two-fold: first, it rehearses the questions that would 
need to be asked if a multilateral regional legal institution were to be 
created; and second, it outlines how uncritical assumptions regarding 
geography can limit imagining development solutions. In other words, by 
unpacking the legal and institutional implications and geographic 
assumptions, this article explores the strengths, weakness, and 
ambiguities in the different conceptions of development. 
In the end, this article determines that the UNDP RBAS reports 
are limited in imagining regional development solutions because of their 
cultural geographic assumptions of what constitutes “Arab.” It also 
suggests that the World Bank’s definition of development is ambiguous 
and this stems from its weak argument for regional integration and 
unclear political geography. 
This article does not strictly compare the reports, as each 
organization has a different mandate, sources of financial support, and 
external perceptions of legitimacy. Instead, it analyzes each report and 
then runs their concept of development through its own prescription for 
regional integration. This tandem analysis is appropriate because the 
reports were not only published at approximately the same time about a 
similarly (though not exactly) delineated region and address similar 
issues, but also because each organization explicitly acknowledges the 
other’s report.10 
                                                          
dependence as a major factor accounting for Africa’s poor economic performance . . . .  [T]he 
World Bank’s Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa–An Agenda for Action Report 
(1987) (Berg Report) [sic], prepared in consultation with African finance ministers, placed major 
emphasis on the improper economic policies pursued by sub-Saharan African governments as the 
primary cause of poor economic performance on the continent.” James Thuo Gathii, A Critical 
Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era 
of Market Centered Development, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 182 (2003). 
 
9
 I draw some of my thinking on law and geography from THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: 
LAW, POWER AND SPACE (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001); LAW AND GEOGRAPHY (Jane 
Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003); Tayyab Mahmud, Geography and International Law: 
Towards a Postcolonial Mapping, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 525 (2007). 
 
10
 See, e.g., GENDER, supra note 1, at 22. 
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To be clear, the argument is not that one report’s geographic 
assumption is more authentic than the other, or that one definition of 
development is necessarily better than the other. Rather, this article’s 
intent is to examine how understanding different geographic assumptions 
can provide a more detailed appreciation of law and development 
prescriptions. As Edward Said notes, “Just as none of us is outside or 
beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over 
geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not 
only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about 
images and imaginings.”11 
My working premise is that there is nothing inherently self-
explanatory in terms such as the “Arab world” or “Middle East.” The 
term “Arab” is often used when authors intend to include notions of 
culture or language.12 “Middle East” was a political demarcation which 
came into general use when the British government established their 
“Middle East Command” during the Second World War.13 The purpose 
of my critical analysis is to examine how these reports impart their own 
regional images. By thus delineating each reports’ geography, this article 
takes up the challenge set out by each development report by 
contributing various analytical tools that may help us better understand 
how to improve the lives of those individuals and communities living in 
the Arab/MENA region. 
Part II outlines both reports. Part III examines the UNDP RBAS, 
and Part IV explores the World Bank reports. Finally, Part V concludes. 
II. OUTLINE OF THE REPORTS 
A. THE REPORTS 
 
The UNDP RBAS published a series of annual reports, the Arab 
Human Development Reports (AHDRs), starting in 2002.14 The reports 
were authored by a number of Arab scholars and intellectuals from a 
multitude of disciplines including economics, cultural studies, and 
                                                          
 
11
 EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 7 (Vintage Books 1994) (1993). 
 
12
 See, e.g., ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES (1991); PHILIP HITTI, HISTORY 
OF THE ARABS 4 (10th ed. 2002). 
 
13
 ROYAL INST. INT’L AFFAIRS, THE MIDDLE EAST: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY 1 (2d 
ed. 1954). 
 
14
 UDNP 2002, supra note 1. 
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political science.15 The AHDRs’ goal was to review the Arab region in an 
“objective” manner based on “serious self-criticism.”16 It was intended to 
act “principally as a critique of, and a charter for, development processes 
relevant both at the regional and country levels.”17 
The tone of the reports has been self-described as one of 
“constructive impatience” stemming from intolerance of the current 
socio-economic situation in the Arab region and frustration with the rosy 
attitude arising from financial institutions.18 The reports garnered much 
attention from the press, Arab people, and Arab state governments. 19 The 
main criticism from some Arab media outlets and many Arab state 
governments was that the reports exposed the region’s weaknesses, 
thereby making the region and its national governments susceptible to 
instability and exploitation.20 This defensive response by Arab state 
governments indicates that the reports struck a sensitive nerve with the 
current regimes. 
The first AHDR was entitled Creating Opportunities for Future 
Generations (AHDR 2002). This report concluded that development in 
the Arab region was due to deficiencies in freedom, knowledge, and 
womanpower—and not a lack of resources.21 These three points became 
the subject of subsequent reports: Building a Knowledge Society (2003) 
(AHDR 2003); Towards Freedom in Arab Society (2004) (AHDR 2004); 
and Empowerment of Arab Women (2005) (AHDR 2005). Together the 
2002–2005 AHDRs formed the first “series” of reports. A new series has 
commenced with the publication of Challenges to Human Security in the 
Arab Countries (2009).22 
The World Bank published a series of four reports with a fifth 
“integrative” report entitled Jobs, Growth, and Governance in the Middle 
                                                          
 
15
 Id. at ix; UDNP 2003, supra note 1, at vii; UDNP 2004, supra note 1, at ix; UDNP 2005, supra 
note 1, at ix. 
 
16
 UNDP 2004, supra note 1, at 1. 
 
17
 Recommended Readings: UN Arab Human Development Report Series, U.N. ALLIANCE OF 
CIVILIZATIONS, http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/72/105/lang,english/ (last visited Jan. 13, 
2011). 
 
18
 UNDP Speech, supra note 2. 
 
19
 Id. Over one million people downloaded the first of the UNDP reports on development in the 
Arab region. For a positive review of the report see, e.g., The Poor Arab Street, THE ECONOMIST 
(Jul. 3, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/1212573. 
 
20
 Living History Interview with ambassador Clovis Maksoud, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS.  621, 628–29 (2007). 
 
21
 UNDP 2002, supra note 1, at 27–29. 
 
22
 Arab States: Human Development Report, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 
http://arabstates.undp.org/subpage.php?spid=14 (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
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East and North Africa: Unlocking the Potential For Prosperity (2003) 
(“Integrative Report”). The Integrative Report compiled findings from 
the following four reports: Trade, Investment, and Development in the 
Middle East and North Africa: Engaging the World (2003) (“Trade, 
Investment”); Better Governance for Development in the Middle East 
and North Africa: Enhancing Inclusiveness and Accountability (2003) 
(“Better Governance”); Gender and Development in the Middle East and 
North Africa: Women in the Public Sphere (2004) (“Gender”); and 
Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Towards a New Social Contract (2004) (“Employment”).23 
The World Bank reports were written with the intent to “enrich 
the debate on the major development challenges of the region at the 
beginning of the 21st century.”24 There are listed on the World Bank 
MENA website as “flagship reports.”25 Similar to the AHDRs, the World 
Bank reports were written for the general public in order to address 
issues of development.26 They had the same broad purpose and were 
intended for public debate, not to serve as a blueprint.27 
The AHDRs have quickly become an intellectual resource, 
evidenced by how regularly they are referenced in the footnotes of legal 
articles addressing human rights or development in the region.28 The 
World Bank reports, however, have been mostly ignored by the legal 
academic community.29 
 
B. THE ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The World Bank and UNDP RBAS have published exemplary 
development publications that merit scrutiny alongside each other 
because the reports have explicitly engaged in a broad-based 
                                                          
 
23
 Hereinafter, the series of four reports as well as the integrative report will be collectively referred 
to as the World Bank reports. 
 
24
 See INTEGRATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at Prologue. 
 
25
 Publications & Reports, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/9ZPPMIKUT0 (last visited Jan. 
14, 2011). 
 
26
 World Bank Speech, supra note 2; UNDP Speech, supra note 2. 
 
27
 World Bank Speech, supra note 2; UNDP Speech, supra note 2. 
 
28
 See, e.g., Mervat Rishmawi, The Revised Arab Charter On Human Rights: A Step Forward?, 5 
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 361, 369 (2005); Ibrahim Saleh, Living in a Lie and Dying in Silence: 
The Trauma of Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa, 11 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
L. 30 (2009). 
 
29
 One example of an article that makes some reference to the World Bank reports in its footnotes 
is Susan L. Sakmar, Globalization and Trade Initiatives in the Arab World: Historical Context, 
Progress to Date, and Prospects for the Future, 42 U.S.F.L. REV. 919 (2008). 
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development debate with an acute awareness of the other organization’s 
reports. Each report cites the same problems in the region: there has been 
and will continue to be a major population boom resulting in widespread 
unemployment, which is further aggravated by the region’s failed and 
autocratic national governments.30 The reports are similar in their tone of 
urgency and acknowledgement that change is imperative. Where the 
reports differ is in the characterization of the problem and the framing of 
a solution. 
The reports were commissioned and published by regional 
bureaus within their respective umbrella international organizations and 
were influenced by each organization’s mandate.31 The World Bank 
defines itself as a development institution that is a “vital source of 
financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the 
world” and uses the catch phrase, “working for a world free of 
poverty.”32 The UNDP describes itself as the “UN’s global development 
network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries 
to knowledge, experience, and resources to help people build a better 
life.”33 
Since each organization has a different mandate, each also has a 
different definition of development. The conceptions of development 
permeate through the reports and lead to varied reasoning for regional 
integration. 
It would be inaccurate to assume that either the World Bank or 
United Nations has its own monolithic, cohesive agenda. The World 
Bank is disaggregated and, as a result, some of its projects actually 
conflict with each other.34 Within the complex UN system, the UNDP is 
                                                          
 
30
 See, e.g., UNDP 2002, supra note 1, at 92–94; UNDP 2003, supra note 1, at 9, 140; UNDP 2004, 
supra note 1, at 109, 122; UNDP 2005, supra note 1, at 8, 20, 38; BETTER GOVERNANCE, supra 
note 1, at 184, 199–205; EMPLOYMENT, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 
31
 World Bank Speech, supra note 2; UNDP Speech, supra note 2. 
 
32
 About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/about (last visited Oct. 29, 
2010); The World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
The World Bank is actually the term that refers to two institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association. 
 
33
 About UNDP, UNDP, http://www.undp.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
 
34
 Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule Of Law” Promise in Economic 
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 
278, 290 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). The World Bank’s analytical framework 
seems to be currently in transition. See WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: 
LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM (World Bank ed. 2005) (showing that the World Bank 
shows signs of trying to learn from the past). For more recent reports, see WORLD BANK, 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT (World Bank ed. 2005), 
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a program under the General Assembly.35  Each UN organ structured 
differently and reports to different bodies.36 One could also imagine that 
each UN organ may have varying degree of internal and external 
prestige, which may affect its relevance in public discourse. 
Of course, the UNDP and World Bank are not the only 
organizations addressing development and regionalization. The United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) 
and the League of Arab States (“Arab League”) also address these 
issues.37 The mandate for both ESCWA and the Arab League is to treat 
regional integration amongst Arab states as a goal, more so than the 
World Bank and UNDP.38 ESCWA and UNDP’s mandate overlap in that 
they were both created to improve social and economic development 
within and among a certain number of Arab states..39 However, ESCWA 
occasionally appears to act as a political forum for Arab national 
governments.40 The Arab League has mainly been a political bloc, albeit 
                                                          
which focuses primarily on equity, “human capacities” and institutions, and is more akin to the 
UNDP Human Development Reports. 
 
35
 See Organizational Chart of the United Nations System, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
 
36
 Id. 
 
37
 There is also the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), whose primary mandate is to encourage stability 
and integration of the capital and financial markets of the Arab region. The AMF also includes 
within its mandate the promotion of trade amongst Arab states and conducts research and reports 
on the issue. It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze the discussion for trade integration 
within this milieu of the AMF. However, it is noteworthy that the AMF has strong ties with the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization. The AMF regularly 
cooperates with the World Bank on various projects. Also, the AMF has signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the World Trade Organization to provide technical assistance and 
capacity building skills to enhance the participation of Arab countries in the multilateral trading 
system and trade negotiations. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO-Arab 
Monetary Fund to Cooperate on Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for 
Arab countries (May 3, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/ 
pres02_e/pr293_e.htm; Seminars and Workshops: Joint Annual Seminar, ARAB MONETARY 
FUND, http://www.amf.org.ae/content/joint-annual-seminar (last visited May 11, 2011). 
 
38
 Profile: Arab League, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 
country_profiles/1550797.stm (last updated June 14, 2010); UN–ESCWA. . . at a Glance, 
UNITED NATIONS–ECON. AND SOC. COMM’N FOR W. ASIA, 3, 
http://www.escwa.un.org/about/Glance.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). 
 
39
 United Nations Development Programme: Arab States, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, 
http://arabstates.undp.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2011); ESCWA at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS 
ECON. AND SOC. COMM’N FOR W. ASIA, http://www.escwa.un.org/about/main.asp (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2011). 
 
40
 ESCWA at a Glance, supra note 39. The ESCWA falls under the United Nations Secretariat 
whereas the UNDP is under the General Assembly. The ESCWA region includes Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Lebanon, Occupied 
Palestinian Territory and Saudi Arabia. Id. This geographic delineation is limited to certain 
members of the Arab League but excludes most of North Africa. In ESCWA’s reports, however, 
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ineffective in presenting or generating a unified, integrated Arab front.41 
Although the Arab League includes economic integration within its 
mandate, there has been very little progress in this regard.42 
II. UNDP REPORTS 
A. DEFINITION OF DEVELOPMENT/FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
 
The AHDRs define development as the increase of human 
freedom by enlarging choices available to people.43 The reports explicitly 
rely on Amartya Sen’s thesis in Development as Freedom44 and conceive 
of development more broadly than traditional economic indicators such 
as gross domestic product, gross national product, or economic growth.45 
The reports’ working premise is that people have an a priori right to a 
“dignified life, materially and morally or spiritually, in body, self and 
soul.”46 Thus, the report considers that development builds upon the 
following two axes: building human capabilities to make it possible to 
achieve a higher level of human welfare, and the efficient and 
appropriate utilization of human capabilities.47 
The AHDR 2004 directly tackles the central issue of “freedom,” 
which the reports consider the core element of development.48 In doing 
so, the AHDR 2004 asks, “[W]hat is the status of freedom and 
governance in the Arab countries?”49 It outlines the following 
deficiencies in freedoms: curtailment of freedom of expression and 
association, government threats to individuals’ lives, abuse of minorities, 
discrimination against women, malnutrition, and poor education.50 The 
AHDRs’ intended audience is the everyday Arab man and woman while 
the intended targets are Arab governments and the international 
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community.51 The AHDRs contend that Arab governments remain 
autocratic and despotic while the international community has hindered 
possibilities of overcoming these regimes.52 Examples of the 
international community’s failings include the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territory and the U.S. led occupation of Iraq.53 According to 
the reports, this has led to a variety of ill effects. The most direct concern 
is that these occupations led to insecurity and directly impacted human 
development in the region.54 Moreover, occupations has also allowed 
autocratic Arab regimes, many supported by the U.S. in the past, to 
maintain a sense of “emergency” to justify extreme measures against 
their own citizens.55 
Arguably, the reports’ greatest strength is that their tone and 
substance helps empower individuals to overcome defeatism and 
encourages the criticism of entrenched autocracies and international 
powers. Having identified the hindrances to development, the AHDRs 
then consider Arab culture as a principal source for development and 
freedom.56 The reports call for new Arab institutions enhancing regional 
integration amongst Arab states.57 The next sections outline how the 
cultural geographic concept of “Arab” informs the UNDP RBAS 
development reports and its prescription for new Arab regional 
institutions. 
 
B. CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE ARAB WORLD 
 
The reports identify two hurdles to Arab development and 
freedom: Arab despotic governments, and world dynamics of 
globalization and the international community as dominated by the 
American and European nations.58 In turn, the text embraces a sense of 
Pan-Arabism based on culture and history to respond to these hurdles.59 
The AHDR 2004 explicitly distances itself from Pan-Arab 
movements of the past such as Nasserism and Ba’athism and 
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acknowledges that the “Arab liberation movement” of the past 
brandished romantic slogans and ended in bitter disappointment.60 The 
reports use the notion of Arab culture partially as a response to the 
disappointment with the multiple forms of Arabism in the 1950s and 
1960s.61 The metric with which the report measures the “success” and 
“failure” of past political regimes is the fact that they achieved very little 
“freedom” in the Arab world.62 
The second use of Arab culture is as a response to globalization 
and the international community.63 The AHDR 2002 argues that the 
whole world is progressing and benefiting from globalization and the 
Arab region is lagging behind and needs to catch-up.64 The AHDR 2002 
describes globalization in the forms of global economic integration and 
trade liberalization as a serious “challenge.”65 Globalization is presented 
neither positively nor negatively—rather it is described as a force so 
pervasive that Arab cooperation is necessary to cope with international 
competition.66 
As a response, the report turns to Arab identity as the vehicle to 
negotiate the inevitability of the modern forces of globalization.67 In 
trying to catch up with the rest of the world, the AHDR 2002 presents 
culture and values as instrumental for development because: 
[T]hey help to shape people’s daily hopes, fears, ambitions, 
attitudes and actions, but they also are formative because they 
mould people’s ideals and inspire their dreams for a fulfilling 
life for themselves and future generations. . . . [B]y by 
influencing values, they [governments] can affect the path of 
development.68 
Then, discussions of Arab values and culture create a dichotomy 
between “traditional” Arab culture and “modern” global values.69 The 
report reconciles this tension between cultural traditionalism and global 
modernity by stating that it can only be resolved by values of democracy, 
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and it is through this democratic process that Arab countries can both 
contribute to and benefit from globalization.70 
Moreover, the reports argue that the international community is 
dominated by the American and European nations, which at times have 
oppressed Arab communities through policies under the “war on terror” 
and through the occupation of Iraq.71 This partially responds to the 
argument that there is something in Arab culture that is inherently 
against freedom, democracy, and Western civilization.72 The AHDR 
2004 makes it clear that: 
[U]ndoubtedly, the real flaw behind the failure of democracy 
in several Arab countries is not cultural in origin. It lies in the 
convergence of political, social and economic structures that 
have suppressed or eliminated organized structures that have 
suppressed or eliminated social an political actors capable of 
turning authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to their 
advantage.73 
Not only are the socio-cultural, historical references employed to 
make the report more accessible to the average Arab reader, but they also 
act to affirm the richness of Arab culture and show that it contains 
indigenous concepts of freedom and democracy that are familiar to the 
Western reader. 74 
 
C. HOW AHDR CONCEPTS OF CULTURE LIMIT PRESCRIPTIONS FOR 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
In addressing the earlier-noted problems of Arab despotic 
governments, globalization, and the international community as 
dominated by American and European states, the reports consider new 
pan-Arab institutions as a possible solution to drive change.75 When 
outlining what positive outcomes Arab regional institutions have 
achieved, the reports have little to say other than that some regional 
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institutions do, in fact, exist.76 The AHDR 2002 examines the various 
Arab regional organizations and generally criticizes these organizations 
for not providing a “well-defined conceptual frame of reference for 
human development, relying instead on developing institutional 
frameworks.”77 Also, the AHDR 2004 notes that there are many people in 
the Arab world that think that the Arab League and the United Nations 
have been ineffective in bringing about any change in local governance 
and are not credible institutions.78 
The AHDR 2004 outlines how regional integration would 
enhance freedom, thereby increasing human development: 
First, it would reverse the deterioration of the pan-Arab 
liberation movements brought about by its division and weakness, and by 
some of its members’ vulnerability to external pressures. Second, it 
would help seize the opportunity currently being missed to establish the 
knowledge society in the Arab countries. This requires close and 
effective inter-Arab coordination the elements of which are present 
except for the political will and commitment . . . . Acquiring and using 
human capabilities at the national levels is enhanced through regional 
complementarity.79 
According to the AHDR 2002, cooperation amongst Arab states 
is necessary to allow Arabs to participate in and benefit from the global 
economy.80 The strongest argument that the reports make for regional 
integration is one about strength in numbers—the Arab world as a bloc 
increases its economic and political power regarding negotiations with 
external pressure from more powerful nations and globalization.81 
Leaving aside the argument as to whether regional, as opposed to 
global, cooperation is desirable, the problem with the reports is they take 
for granted that Arab regional cooperation is necessary. This might be 
because the reports were written under the auspices of the UNDP RBAS, 
which by definition encompasses the Arab world. However, the reports’ 
definition of Arab is not necessarily countries under the auspices of 
UNDP RBAS, nor is it self-explanatory. Indeed, the AHDRs do not 
conspicuously define what countries are included in the Arab region. The 
first explicit definition of the term Arab is in a footnote in the AHDR 
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2004. It defines Arab to mean “citizens of Arab countries inclusively.”82 
By looking at countries listed in charts, statistics, and analyses in the 
AHDRs, it appears that the term Arab states means the states within the 
Arab League.83 By defining Arab as citizens of Arab countries, the report 
in effect includes all minorities in the region even if they are not 
culturally or linguistically Arab. 
Nevertheless, the AHDRs’ use of the term Arab is more 
multifaceted than this formal political definition. The reports regularly 
mention both recent and historic popular culture, poetry, philosophy, 
intellectual history, and religious texts.84 The reports use culture to argue 
that Arab culture includes ideas of freedom espoused by the AHDRs.85 
We can better understand how the AHDRs use Arab culture if we keep in 
mind that the reports are purported to be an exercise in “self-criticism” 
written primarily for an Arab audience.86 The socio-cultural, historical 
references act as signposts for the average Arab reader, making the 
AHDR more accessible by providing a familiar terrain for the public to 
engage. This section outlines, however, how the reports’ particular use of 
Arab identity contributes to ambiguous prescriptions for development 
and regional integration. 
The reports consider Arab culture to be the central normative 
source of ideas and norms that will lead to human freedom and 
development—Arab culture as a source of development.87 As such, this 
article examines below how the reports construct the notion of Arab and 
how it contributes to limiting the ability to determine how development 
is to be achieved. To be clear, I am not challenging the use of culture or 
the normativity of Arab identity in debates about development.88 Rather, 
I argue that within this particular construction of Arab identity, any 
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development plans will build on an understanding of the past that 
presupposes the solution before conducting further analysis. Arab 
regional institutions are the assumed form to address development. 
The reports suppose that Arab regional integration is necessary 
but provide very little guidance as to how to achieve regional integration. 
According to the reports, a major hurdle in integrating Arab countries has 
been Arab rulers’ repression of their own people.89 The reports’ 
limitation in outlining how to overcome government repression is that its 
reasoning is circular—in order to bring about the national political will 
necessary to create regional institutions that will improve local 
governance and resist international pressures, the current form of 
national governance must be changed.90 But, in order to change the form 
of national governance, regional cooperation is necessary.91 This 
circularity likely stems from the reports’ presumption that regional 
cooperation and integration necessarily means Arab regional 
cooperation. This presupposed underlying “Arabness” assumes that all 
individuals, communities, and countries within the Arab world have 
(more or less) the same political, social, and economic interests. 
How this reasoning limits prescriptions to create regional 
cooperation and achieve human development is best exemplified in the 
AHDR 2004’s characterization of the European Union (EU) as a 
“leading model” for regional integration.92 The AHDR 2004 notes that 
the E.U. model developed from existing preconditions that: 
[C]itizens are entitled to participate in government at the 
national level; representational bodies are already equipped 
with extensive legislative powers; there is a partnership 
between government, civil society organizations and market 
institutions; while the judiciary protects the rights of the 
parties.93 
Unfortunately, the AHDRs are silent as to how to meet these 
preconditions in order to create an effective regional structure. 
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The AHDR 2004 addresses the multiplicity of Arab identity as 
evidenced in the discussion of freedom in Arab history and culture: 
The general call to respect human rights and to guarantee the 
fundamental freedoms of Arab citizens is no longer voiced for its own 
sake in Arab intellectual circles; these principles have become the two 
vital conditions for an Arab renaissance. Arab nationalists, liberals, 
Islamists, Marxists and independents unanimously proclaim the call. Not 
all agree on the limits of such freedoms and rights or on their scope of 
particular manifestations: some speak of personal freedom and freedom 
of belief, others speak of economic, social, political, and other freedoms. 
There are differences, sometimes fundamental, in how the various groups 
perceive these issues.94 
Nevertheless, the tone of the report remains universalistic.95 The 
authors frame the debate in distinctly liberal terms—they make any 
discussion concerning “identity” an issue about “rights and freedoms.”96 
The earlier-noted statement presupposes that a liberal would rather work 
towards an Arab renaissance than would a cosmopolitan. It also 
presupposes that a Marxist would rather not work towards the 
International, and that the Islamist would rather not work towards the 
Islamic Nation. There is debate about self-identification within the Arab 
states that extends beyond a difference in defining “rights and freedoms” 
that affects political economy. Every identity involves different sources 
of socio-economic power and intellectual energy. For example, an 
Islamist perspective may be sympathetic to Mecca/Riyadh or Tehran as 
sources of power—centers of influence that other identities would reject. 
Moreover, an Islamist’s view of the geopolitical world is most likely to 
be broader than the pan-Arabist’s which changes the vision of regional 
integration.97 
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For instance, the AHDR 2002 highlights how the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) is a very good example of what the 
reports’ authors may have had in mind regarding an Arab regional 
organization.98 The G.C.C., however, would be a “sub-regional” bloc 
under the reports’ “Arab world” geographic framework.99 And yet, the 
reports never examine why there should not be sub-regional blocs within 
the Arab world. Moreover, why are the interests of Arab states in the 
Gulf the same as those in the Levant or those in North Africa? Why are 
the interests of Saudi Arabia the same as the United Arab Emirates? The 
Shi’ite and the Sunni in Bahrain? The Armenians and Kurds in Lebanon? 
The Kurds in Syria and the Kurds in Iraq? This all raises broader 
questions of geographic delineation such as: Why is the Arab state the 
main component of a regional institution? Why not sub-regions within 
the Arab world? Why not regional integration beyond the Arab world? 
The AHDRs in general eschew a simplistic, teleological 
understanding of history. The AHDR 2003 notes that “failing to see 
history and heritage as living, ongoing and self-renewing human 
processes, where the march of progress is never complete, is misleading 
and therefore harmful to present and future generations.”100 Even with a 
sophisticated historical sensibility, any account of cultural identity is still 
informed by some particular narrative. According to the AHDRs’ 
narrative, Arab culture’s social and intellectual foundation lies in the 
Islamic empires of the Prophet Mohammed, first four Caliphs, the 
Umayyad Empire, and Abbasid Empire (a time span ranging from the 7th 
to 13th centuries C.E.). This was a culturally rich moment during which 
early Arab notions of freedom were examined and developed.101 
The nineteenth century was the other important cultural moment 
in the AHDRs’ story of Arab identity. According to the AHDR narrative 
this was era of diverse possibilities and contradictions. Western 
capitalism penetrated Arab society, radically reconfiguring human 
relations.102 Western thought—especially French theories of liberty—
provided Arab intellectuals the tools to challenge Ottoman and European 
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tyranny.103 The nineteenth century was also the time of the first 
generation of the women’s movement in the Arab world.104 Continuing 
with the AHDRs, the final moment of importance the time of Arab 
nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. During this time numerous visions 
of political and social Arab identity such as Nasserism and Ba’athism 
proliferated. Even though Arab political identity of the time was guarded 
if not sometimes hostile in regard to its relationship with the West, Arab 
cultural identity enthusiastically engaged Western ideas such as 
existentialism and Marxism.105 Women’s organizations and movements 
flourished during this time creating a momentum of gender politics that 
would last well into the 1980s.106 
The AHDRs are most uncomfortable with the Arab nationalism 
of the 1950s and 1960s. Their frustration is that Arab national 
governments carried on the ideas of Arabism derived from the 1950s and 
1960s and failed miserably by creating autocratic regimes and 
mismanaging the relationship with Israel and the West.107 
Like many histories linked to contemporary identities, the 
AHDRs’ cultural history and geography is stylized.108 It selects what 
moments in the past have determined Arab identity, based on what is 
considers normatively desirable. We must therefore interrogate the 
AHDRs’ notion of Arab. 
First, it is necessary to examine the implications of the reports’ 
goal to achieve an Arab “renaissance.”109 Implied in this particular call 
for a renaissance is an intention to reexamine the nineteenth century 
cultural moment described by some commentators as the nahda (which is 
the word for cultural awakening or renaissance in the Arabic 
language).110 To Makdisi, the nahda of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries created a narrative of Arab identity.111 Makdisi 
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describes how the nahda was expressed in the 1950s and 1960s in the 
form of Arab nationalism and contributed to creation of Arab states. 
As discussed earlier, the AHDRs are deeply disappointed with 
the history of Arab nationalism and state governments. It is the Arab 
states which were finally created in the 1950s and 1960s which the 
AHDRs take issue with. We can therefore extrapolate that to the 
AHDRs, the nahda is interpreted as a moment of Arab cultural 
awakening which later failed because it was formalized through 
autocratic states. 
But, what is it about the nahda that the AHDRs want to capture 
by prescribing a renaissance of culture and knowledge? The answer lies 
in how the reports configure a particular notion of Arab culture. To be 
sure, the AHDRs do not want to return to the politics of the nahda but 
instead want to reinterpret Arab cultural identity for today. The nahda 
was a moment of cultural and political possibilities.112 Therefore, by 
referencing a moment of possibilities, the AHDRs’ call for a renaissance 
is part of its attempt to reclaim parts of history that may form the basis of 
creating an invigorated theory of development. 
Whereas, the nahda inspired Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 
1960s, the nahda is employed by the AHDRs to evoke a popular notion 
of Arab unity which transcends or avoids national boundaries.113 The 
reports’ historical cultural narrative of Arab unity attempts to reconfigure 
the history of Arab identity away from nationalist and state-based politics 
towards one focused on the idea of freedom that brings together the Arab 
world. The reports note how a great number of freedoms were obtained 
in the nineteenth century only to be lost in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
AHDRs also reference Arab philosophical and literary texts from pre-
Ottoman Islamic empires or folk songs throughout the reports in a way 
that are meant to inspire the reader’s notion of how freedom may 
challenge tyranny.114 Indeed, the reports trace Arab origins of rights and 
freedoms to the time of pre-Ottoman Islamic empires, which continues 
the pattern of distancing the reports from the Arabism of the 1950s and 
1960s. In sum, the AHDRs draw upon texts and moments from the 
Abbasid Empire, the nineteenth century, and mid-twentieth century in a 
way that finds and highlights the idea of freedom within a notion of Arab 
culture. 
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Recalling the discussion above, it may very well be necessary to 
evoke this sort of Arab identity to provide people with the confidence to 
politically mobilize and counter essentialist understandings of Arab 
culture in the past.115 Indeed, the tone of the reports is refreshing, and its 
targeting of Arab regimes and the international community is 
commendable. The problem, however, is that the UNDP RBAS narrative 
is a particular notion of Arabness which by definition emphasizes Arab 
unity despite state boundaries. While this goal may be commendable, the 
AHDRs’ conception of Arab culture does not encourage detailed 
historical analyses to understand the realities of today. With this sort of 
conception of Arab culture which takes unity as a given, it is therefore 
not surprising that the AHDRs provide little explanation as to why pan-
Arab regional integration is necessary to achieve development and how 
such development can be achieved. Thus by attempting to empower Arab 
people, the reports may ironically be staving off deeper self-reflection 
and understanding. 
 
III. WORLD BANK REPORTS 
A. DEFINITION OF DEVELOPMENT/FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
 
The World Bank reports describe the problem of development in 
the MENA region as one premised by the fact that it has economically 
“fallen behind” the rest of the world.116 In describing how the region has 
fallen behind, the World Bank presents what it considers a self-evident 
“simple statistic”: world trade has grown at 8 percent per year in the last 
decade but the region’s trade grew only 3 percent.117 The proposed 
solution is to engage with the world economy and tap into “the rich 
stream of global commerce and investment” in order for the region to 
harness its economic potentialities.118 More specifically, according to the 
reports, there has been a major population boom in the region that has 
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caused the main economic challenge of creating sufficient employment 
opportunities.119 
The World Bank reports characterization of the development 
problem and solutions can generally be described as a recent 
manifestation of an “augmented Washington Consensus.”120 The reports 
consider unemployment a waste of resources and a major threat to social 
and political stability.121 The stipulated solution is to increase economic 
growth by liberalizing trade and increasing foreign investment.122 The 
solution is presented like this: In order for the gains from growth to be 
attained, MENA countries need to improve their system of governance. 
Thus, once the system of governance is improved, increased employment 
due to gender equality and the exploitation of recent gains in growth can 
be utilized. Trade and investment offer the most viable engine for growth 
and is therefore the core of reform.123 
The World Bank reports state that “the central issue going 
forward is for MENA countries to capture the largest gains possible from 
[global] economic integration and to take advantage of the opportunities 
missed for the past two decades.”124 Since this is the central goal, 
“political leaders, labor unions and civil society” must all work in 
tandem and create a “consensus” towards liberalizing trade and 
increasing confidence in the private sector.125 The title of the Integrative 
Report, Jobs, Growth, and Better Governance, is helpful in 
understanding the logical structure of the reports: the problem is 
identified (jobs), followed by the solution (growth), and the medium to 
deliver the solution (good governance).126 
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The Integrative Report presents the relationship between 
governance and economic growth as a dynamic one: 
The governance agenda is not a separate challenge, to be 
worked on at its own pace. It is a complementary and 
reinforcing agenda to reform efforts in private investment, 
trade, and economic diversification by changing governance 
mechanisms, thereby improving capacity and incentives 
within government while fostering a larger role for civil 
society in governance.127 
The reports identify a difficulty in establishing the causal 
relationship between growth, policy reform, and good governance.128 One 
may discern from this difficulty a tension amongst and within the 
different World Bank reports in defining whether development is 
achieved more by emphasizing economic growth or good governance. 
The majority of reports treat economic development as the 
principal lens through which to examine trade and investment, gender, 
and employment.129 However, Better Governance marks a shift in priority 
when compared to the other reports in the series. This is the particular 
World Bank report that addresses governance the most extensively and 
provides the driving prescriptive logic for policy makers. 
The thesis of Better Governance is “that development in 
MENA—economic, social, and human—is being handicapped by 
weakness in the quality of public governance.”130 Better Governance 
offers the following policies in order to overcome development 
deficiencies: “inclusiveness” (which includes equal participation and 
equal treatment) and “accountability” (which includes transparency and 
contestability).131 The report states: 
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Policies and the quality of governance interact in complex 
ways, making it difficult to identify their individual 
contributions to growth. Policy reforms can lead to 
improvements in governance quality. Some evidence suggests 
that greater openness to trade is conducive to better 
governance.132 
This statement exemplifies the difficulties in establishing a 
causal link between the elements of growth, policy reform, and good 
governance. The tone of the Integrative Report is different—it presents 
the causal links between the three elements more forcefully. The 
Integrative Report considers the three elements to be linked by a 
“complementary dynamic.”133 Better Governance is less determinate and 
considers the elements to be linked by a “complex link.”134 
The tensions between the Integrative Report and Better 
Governance are also evidenced within Trade, Investment. The report 
provides that it is unclear how to determine the content, pace, and 
sequence of trade reforms that need to be locally sensitive.135 It notes that 
some historical evidence exists that many countries achieved growth 
through heterodox approaches to liberalizing trade and investment.136 
Despite this initial circumspect tone, the report then goes on to strongly 
suggest that the best approach to achieving gains from liberalized trade 
would be to quickly and non-incrementally adopt broad-based trade and 
tariff reforms accompanied by “bold” investment deregulation.137 
Better Governance, by deemphasizing the economic and 
highlighting governance in its conception of development, seems to be 
complementing the AHDR. In fact, it actually makes direct reference to 
the AHDR 2002 to reinforce its thesis.138 However, Better Governance, 
unlike the AHDRs (and most relevantly, the AHDR 2004), explicitly 
acknowledges the potential circularity of the problem of local 
institutions: 
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[P]oor governance reflects the failure of institutions; yet the 
creation of better institutions itself requires the emergence of 
other institutions, notably active, inclusive, and responsible 
participation. . . .[T]he transition to good governance also 
requires tolerance of compromises and mistakes.139 . . . . 
[B]uilding governance is a two-way street: opening the 
governance arena without already capable institutions can lead 
to chaos; capable institutions themselves need such an 
opening—as well as stability—to emerge and thrive.140 
The World Bank reports, like the AHDRs, prescribe regional 
integration as a primary vehicle to achieve its development goals.141 The 
different World Bank reports, however, prescribe regional integration for 
different purposes. This is not surprising in light of the different 
definitions of development between the majority of the AHDRs and 
Better Governance. The next section explicates the different 
prescriptions for regional integration between Trade, Investment and 
Better Governance in order to better understand the difference between 
two understandings of development within the World Bank reports. 
 
B. REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
1. REGIONAL INTEGRATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF LIBERALIZING TRADE 
 
The World Bank’s primary report, Trade, Investment, defines 
development as economic growth and considers liberalized trade and 
investment to be the main engines of growth.142 According to Trade, 
Investment, regional agreements are an avenue to speed up the 
integration of MENA countries into the “global” economy.143 The report 
argues that regional integration agreements should create a “deep” 
integration of agriculture, services, and labor in order to create increased 
growth from trade, investment, and finance in the region.144 Therefore, 
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the report continues, agreements with more developed regions or 
countries should involve greater access to agricultural products to allow 
increased exports from MENA countries, greater export of temporary 
workers from MENA countries, and relaxed rules of origin and 
harmonized standards. 145 
Trade, Investment does not assume that regional integration 
agreements are the best or most efficient way of entering the multilateral 
trading community. Quite the opposite—the report assumes that entering 
the WTO is ideal for development.146 The report, nevertheless, concedes 
that joining the WTO is politically and administratively difficult.147 Thus, 
the report reconciles with the fact that regional integration agreements 
exist and should therefore be shaped in a manner conducive to future 
membership in a multilateral, global trading regime.148 This concern 
about the WTO membership may change due to the fact that 
Arab/MENA countries are lining up to join the WTO.149 
The report outlines deeper integration to entail greater 
cooperation to harmonize policies and administrative procedures across a 
broad range of activities, including customs operations, health and safety 
standards, licensing and certification, supervision of financial services, 
and competition/antitrust legislation.150 It would also require greater 
openness to trade in services and freer flow of labor and capital.151 The 
report summarizes the argument as such: 
What would deep integration promise? A recent quantitative 
estimate suggests that the overall gains from liberalizing trade in both 
services and goods (and removing various regulatory nontariff barriers in 
the process) are about 6 to 10 percent of baseline GDP in Egypt and 
Tunisia, respectively. 
The dynamic gains from liberalizing trade in goods and services 
can outstrip the static gains, with productivity improvements as the main 
driver. Estimating the dynamic benefits involves considerable 
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uncertainty, but simulations suggest that they can be more than twice the 
static gains. Factors likely to enhance productivity in tradable goods 
include: 
• Increased investment embodying new technology, to expand capacity 
and take advantage of greater export opportunities. 
• Transfers of technology and management, known to come in through 
greater openness. 
• Greater economies of scale, from the increase in production and the 
access to larger markets. [reference notes removed]152 
An increasing number of development economists are suggesting 
that the purpose of trade is to generate “dynamic gains.”153 Traditionally, 
neoclassical economists have made very few clear linkages between 
trade liberalization and growth especially in characterizing how trade 
liberalization affects resource allocation and income distribution.154 In the 
past, the focus has been on static gains: “one-shot” gains from the 
comparative advantage in a particular sector until new circumstances 
arise that change the comparative advantage.155 
The World Bank report’s argument for dynamic gains rests on 
the premise that primary gains made from trade are not strictly 
commercial but rather the indirect gains from the exchange of 
technologies and ideas.156 The concept of dynamic gains considers, not 
simply resource reallocation (as is the case for static gains), but enhanced 
productivity from increased competition in the market.157 Models 
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constructed on the premise of dynamic gains examine notions such as 
imperfect competition, economies of scale, and countries’ trade 
performance and competitiveness in light of intricacies such as 
technology transfer, intangible capital, and complex trade and industrial 
strategies at the level of firms and nations.158 
Trade, Investment makes some reference to static gains, but this 
is not central to its argument for regional integration. Instead, it focuses 
on the potential dynamic gains.159 Noting the language quoted above, the 
report characterizes the dynamic gains from deep integration as a 
“promise.”160 This marks the report’s prescription with some prudence. 
New models and theories of dynamic gains are still being explored with 
the results remaining uncertain and far from conclusive.161 Moreover, 
even if there is a correlation between trade and dynamic gains, what 
remains unclear is what mechanisms are necessary to ensure there is the 
transfer of technology and ideas. Furthermore, a problem remains as to 
how to make certain that the dynamic gains accrued actually alleviate 
poverty and promote development. Even if a country generates increased 
gains from economic growth (whether from a liberal trade regime or 
not), the gains do not necessarily correlate to changes in income 
distribution or domestic policy.162 
 
2. REGIONAL INTEGRATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPROVING GOOD 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Better Governance, as discussed earlier, suggests that 
development problems stem from weak institutions, and that solutions 
will come from better institutions that improve governance. In the 
chapter entitled “Pathways to Good Governance,” the report focuses on 
overcoming “the governance gap.”163 Most of the chapter focuses on 
advocating the benefits of the principles and values of good governance. 
One suggested benefit is the predicted inclusiveness that would arise 
from equal participation, equal treatment, and accountability through 
transparency and contestability.164 For example, one benefit would be 
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answering why good governance matters. Other ensued benefits are the 
mechanisms that enhance good governance. This might be something 
like more reliable information on public performance, or increased civil 
society participation (i.e. answering what good governance “looks 
like”).165 
It is worth quoting the report in some length, for this is the only 
point in the chapter (and the report) that focuses on how to achieve good 
governance. According to the report, the first way of overcoming the 
governance gap is through popular organization: 
Rising to the challenge of better governance is not solely, or 
even mainly, the responsibility of governments—because 
many in government as well as many outside government may 
resist the move to be more inclusive and more accountable. 
Although it inevitably requires action by governments, better 
governance also requires more proactive participation by the 
people. The governance challenge is, thus, a challenge for 
everyone in the region.166 
The second way to achieve good governance is external to 
MENA and also is political: 
In some cases, the prospects of deeper voluntary economic 
association with some industrial countries and organizations, 
such as the European Union, may reinforce a dynamic within a 
MENA country to improve governance. Such agreements 
themselves provide a lock-in device to help shore up the 
credibility of governance institutions. And outside partners 
can reinforce efforts to enhance human and institutional 
capacity within the region—both to monitor and to debate 
governance issues and to build staff capability in institutions 
that underpin good governance such as supreme audit 
organizations, which are within governments, and the media 
and citizen watchdog groups, which are outside 
governments).167 
The first way to overcome the governance gap is to call for 
popular political action on a regional level.168 The second way calls for 
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deep external voluntary association with industrialized countries and the 
EU169: 
[C]ountries (their people and their governments) need to 
tolerate and promote continual open dialogue (which will 
encourage and protect the emerging participatory institutions) 
and to avoid scrapping the institutions if they yield outcomes 
that some people do not like. This tolerance may mean 
accepting second-best solutions, such as an agreement of 
major groups to share power in order to minimize risks of 
instability or even civil-strife. . .170 
Read closely, however, the report not only displays a strong 
affinity with non-MENA industrialized countries but also distrusts local 
participatory action. According to the report, if “some people” are not 
pleased with the results (which is inevitable), they should learn to 
“tolerate” it and not participate to try to challenge or change these 
policies.171 The report has no qualms prescribing political participation in 
one breath and then dissuading significant political challenges in the 
next. It suggests that people should only participate if they are on board 
with the broader vision of “good governance” even though what good 
governance will look like is unclear because “the transition is, by its 
nature, unchartered. And it will vary country by country.”172 
Moreover, the report provides no explanation as to why 
industrial countries or the EU will provide a structure in their association 
with the MENA countries that will promote good governance. The report 
takes account of the power dynamic between the industrial countries and 
MENA and suggests that these countries can provide technical assistance 
for particular programs that maintain pressure to meet the principles and 
values of good governance.173 The report assumes that external assistance 
and deep integration is, by definition, normatively desirable because it is 
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external to the MENA region. It considers the “credibility” that 
associations with industrialized countries will provide. The report never 
makes explicit why this association garners credibility (money? 
knowledge? prestige? neo-colonial instinct?). Nor does it explain why 
credibility from industrialized countries will provide for “good 
governance” mechanisms that meet the report’s criteria or that will 
improve development. 
In sum, Better Governance has argued for a particular policy 
direction towards institutions of good governance combined with a 
particular economic policy goal of liberal trade and growth. It is one 
thing to consider the realities of continuous dialogue, negotiation, and 
political compromises and another to dissuade substantive challenges to 
policies. The report implicitly suggests that people and governments in 
MENA just have to trust the principles of good governance and the aid of 
industrialized countries and hope for the best. 
 
3. DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND IMAGES OF 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
The various World Bank reports present different images of 
regional integration and do so for different reasons. To recap, Trade, 
Investment considers deep regional integration as a step toward 
benefiting from the economic growth generated from liberalized trade 
and eventually leading to global market integration.174 Better Governance 
considers that integration with organizations and associations outside of 
MENA will improve mechanisms of governance.175 
Read together the reports are not consistent in their images of 
regionalism. It is unclear whether MENA countries should integrate 
because regional integration is the most efficient way of achieving short-
term growth and long-term global integration (as argued in Trade, 
Investment), or because it is the most effective path to good governance 
through deep integration with industrialized countries or the EU (as 
argued in Better Governance). Indeed, these can be contradictory 
purposes. For example, deep regional integration (as suggested by Trade, 
Investment) may lead to a strengthening MENA’s negotiating power as a 
bloc, which would affect any sort of integration with the EU or 
industrialized countries (as suggested by Better Governance). Moreover, 
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if MENA forms an economic union it may actually entrench the current 
political regimes and forms of governance; even if this arrangement 
increased economic growth, it would be problematic according to Better 
Governance’s definition of development. Moreover, if this union 
achieved great economic growth and political power it could also reduce 
the influence of the E.U. or industrialized countries. 
Thus far, this article has suggested that the World Bank reports’ 
potentially contradictory images of regional integration stem from the 
different underlying theories of development. The World Bank reports 
are unclear as to whether economic growth or good governance takes 
precedent over the other in the definition of development. What further 
contributes to the ambiguity, examined in the next section, is that the 
World Bank reports are inconsistent in what countries they consider 
included in the MENA region. 
 
C. POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF MENA 
 
The reports’ definitions of development and respective regional 
prescriptions are obfuscated by unclear political geography because each 
different definition of MENA used in the reports has different political 
and economic implications. Two of the reports define MENA differently. 
Trade, Investment uses a criterion composed of a mix of income bracket, 
available data, and geopolitics: 
In World Bank geographic classification, the following 21 
countries or territories constitute the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region: six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates 
[UAE]), and 15 other countries or territories: Algeria, Djibouti, the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, the Republic of Yemen, the Syrian 
Arab Republic, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza. This report focuses on 
a subset of 16 countries that covers most (more than 90 percent) of the 
population and geographic size of the region: 10 low- and middle-income 
countries (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Republic of Yemen, Syria, and Tunisia) and 6 
partners in the G.C.C. Others are not covered in any depth because 
information is limited (Iraq, Libya), or they have special characteristics 
(West Bank and Gaza), or they are high-income (Israel, Malta). Although 
the countries in the region show considerable diversity in economic 
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structure and circumstances, certain commonalities and features allow a 
focus on broader regional trade and development issues in this chapter.176 
Gender explicitly defines MENA as follows: 
This report covers the following 19 countries and territories of 
the Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, 
the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the 
Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic 
of Yemen. The region has a rich historical and cultural 
heritage, and it is the birthplace of some of the oldest 
civilizations and empires. About three-quarters of the region’s 
325 million people share the same language (Arabic)—the 
remainder speak Farsi—and the majority are Muslim. A great 
number of minority ethnic and religious groups inhabit the 
region. The region has established urban centers, yet the 
geography also includes large, relatively isolated regions with 
large rural populations. Some 40 percent of the population 
lives in nonurban areas, and some areas have extensive 
nomadic groups.177 
Therefore, there are differences between World Bank reports in 
the MENA series. The World Bank and Trade, Investment use the term 
“West Bank and Gaza” whereas Gender uses “Palestinian Territories.”178 
Gender includes Djibouti, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq in its 
definition of MENA, whereas Trade, Investment does not. 
Moreover, the reports’ list of countries differs from the World 
Bank’s general definition of MENA. On the World Bank’s website, it 
delineates MENA to include Israel and Malta, in contrast to the 
definition in its  reports.179 But the two World Bank reports exclude Israel 
and Malta for different reasons—Gender does so because it takes some 
sort of cultural-linguistic delineation180 and Trade, Investment does so 
because of income brackets.181 
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Gender’s divergence may also be due to the nature of the report 
itself, which is the most “socially” oriented of the World Bank reports.182 
Gender makes explicit that it intends to discuss gender equality “in the 
region by framing the issues in terms of economic necessity,” 
distinguishing it from when gender equality “issues in MENA are usually 
approached from a social, anthropological, or political angle.”183 The 
authors of Gender acknowledged that gender is a social construct and 
were very precise in the use of the term “gender inequality.”184 
Unfortunately, they did not extend this consciousness of social constructs 
to their definition of MENA. Admittedly, however, the authors of 
Gender were still the only World Bank writers who had enough sense of 
geography to provide some explanation why certain countries were 
included in their construction of MENA. 
Both the World Bank the World Bank MENA reports exclude 
Turkey from their delineation of MENA and instead place it under the 
“Europe and Central Asia.”185 This is noteworthy because Turkey is 
sometimes included in MENA by prominent scholars.186 The exclusion of 
Turkey is not in and of itself problematic, but it may remove the region’s 
Ottoman history from the analysis, remnants of which still exist in local 
language, custom, law, and bureaucracy.187 The World Bank may exclude 
Turkey from MENA because it is helping Turkey apply to the EU188 But 
Malta, a member of the EU, is included in the World Bank’s definition of 
MENA, although it is excluded from the reports analyzed here.189 Thus, it 
is difficult to determine why Turkey is not in any of the World Bank’s 
definitions of MENA. 
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In light of the discrepancy between the definitions of the World 
Bank, Trade, Investment, and Gender, it is regrettable that MENA was 
not defined in the Integrative Report. Trade, Investment takes the World 
Bank classification of MENA as its starting point and uses a variety of 
criteria to exclude countries included in World Bank definitions in its 
analysis.190 Gender uses a different political geography all together and 
provides a limited explanation of how it included countries in its 
definition of MENA.191 Other reports leave out a definition of MENA all 
together. The rationale for the discrepancy among the World Bank as an 
organization and the World Bank’s MENA development reports is 
unclear. This may be because of the varying authorship of the reports. 
Nevertheless, with at least three different maps of MENA, this 
inconsistency implies that the authors may not have sufficiently 
considered the importance of geography in their analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
If we hold the World Bank reports’ map against UNDP RBAS 
reports’ map, then we can see how different regional images have 
different political and economic implications and why concepts of 
geography matter in development debates. The World Bank includes 
Israel and Iran.192 The UNDP RBAS includes Somalia and Sudan.193 This 
brings into the regional map an element of volatility due to the recent and 
ongoing civil strife and war in those two countries.194 The World Bank 
brings in a different political instability by including Iran and Israel—
two states with a well-funded military and vehemently opposed to each 
other. 
The difference between the organizations is most evident with 
respect to the characterization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
World Bank report Gender lists “Palestinian Territories”195 whereas 
UNDP RBAS lists the “Occupied Palestinian Territories.”196 UNDP 
RBAS reports’ use of “Occupied Palestinian Territory” implies a 
judgment of Israel’s position in the region. The explicit inclusion of 
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Israel and use of “West Bank and Gaza” by the World Bank is an 
acceptance by the World Bank, as an organization, to some degree, of the 
geopolitical status quo. Whereas Gender falls into a middle ground—it 
excludes Israel, does not use “West Bank and Gaza” and removes 
“Occupied” from “Palestinian Territories.”197 The exclusion by Trade, 
Investment of “West Bank and Gaza” because its “special 
characteristics” without any explanation of what it considers those 
characteristics leaves the reader wondering why the Palestinians are 
written out of this report and what their role may be in regards to trade 
and development in the region.198 This opaqueness suggests that with the 
exclusion of Israel, because of high income, and the Palestinian people, 
because of undefined special circumstances,199 Trade, Investment 
considers the Palestinian people’s fate to be in the hands of the state of 
Israel and not with MENA.200 To the UNDP RBAS reports, Israel’s role 
in the region and the world is a central concern because of (among other 
things) its occupation of Palestinian land,201 whereas to the World Bank’s 
Trade, Investment, Israel is only a concern because its border crossings 
slow down the flow of goods from Jordan.202 
In sum, what is lost from the UNDP’s narrow use of culture and 
the World Bank’s careless political geography is the ability to analyze 
mechanisms of governance, patterns of trade, and potential for 
development within actually existing conditions within the region. With 
these understandings, it is then also worth considering the fact that the 
“region consists of economies with similar production and export 
structures” not as a detriment to intraregional trade as commonly done,203 
but rather as a potential source of cooperation amongst actors within an 
industry. Even if we were take the World Bank reports’ weak “promise” 
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of dynamic gains from liberalized trade, an examination of the networks 
of people and knowledge is crucial in order to understand how 
technology and intangible capital can spill over. For example, citrus 
growers in the Levant could consider cooperative measures that would at 
least allow for sharing knowledge. Another example would be to look at 
how the various Arab communities around the world actually play a role 
in the trade and development patterns in the region.204 
Within states, it is also important to acknowledge informal 
networks that are powerful mechanisms of governance.205 Better 
Governance provides some examples of informal networks that have 
filled the governance void, for better or for worse, left by formal state 
governments. In Syria, recruitment for the government bureaucracy is 
overcome by political and familial preference.206 Diwaniyyas (discussion 
salons) in Kuwait act as informal networks of individuals formed from 
overlapping professional, religious, political, and economic ties, which in 
effect constrain arbitrariness of the state and authoritarianism.207 Also in 
Kuwait, when parliament was suspended, jama’at ta’awuniyya 
(neighborhood cooperative societies) served as important popular 
political platforms.208 In Jordan, linkages of kin, culture, religion, and 
neighborliness are placed as a priority and act as a more efficient system 
of governance than the formal nation-state government in addressing 
human needs, regulating the exercise of power, protecting rights of 
individuals, and do so in a way that is relatively more inclusive, 
participatory, and transparent.209 Better Governance asks: 
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Why are Egyptian bureaucrats so good at building roads, but 
slow at eradicating illiteracy? Why are the Lebanese 
administrators so effective at immunizing children, but so 
ineffective at drastically reducing infant mortality? And why 
has Tunisia been so successful at increasing the number of 
telephone mainlines, but not as effective in increasing access 
to the Internet, the tool for today’s information age?210 
This report, however, treats informal systems of governance as 
“factoids” sidelined in the main discussion about governance.211 If we 
consider combinations of informal, non-nation-state, sub-national or 
regional networks, and systems of governance that have an effect upon 
communities, decision-making, and institution-building not as factoids 
but as an intermingled terrain, then we can ask more nuanced questions. 
Communities can work to identify entry points within current political 
and legal regimes in order to agitate for change and avoid the malaise 
and cynicism that both the UNDP and World Bank reports try to 
overcome. 
Indeed, the issues addressed by the reports are not limited to 
texts produced by international organizations. Samir Kassir, a prominent 
professor of history and journalist in Lebanon, also examines issues of 
development in his essay On Being Arab, published in English after he 
was assassinated on June 2, 2005.212 Like the World Bank and UNDP 
RBAS reports, Kassir takes a regional view to ask development 
questions. Like the AHDRs, Kassir uses the Arab world as his point of 
reference and also highlights how the culture and psychology of malaise 
and victimhood shackled the Arab world.213 Kassir, however, does not 
frame his normative assessment in terms of economic growth, political 
governance, or formal regional integration. Nor does he take Arab 
identity as a given or evoke a nostalgic renaissance. Like the UNDP 
RBAS reports, he looks at the nahda as a revolutionary moment of Arab 
identity.214 However, he calls for a more complex understanding of Arab 
geography and history in relation to their identity: “If Arabs don’t 
reclaim this history [of the nahda], their relationship with modernity in 
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the twenty-first century will remained warped by misunderstanding.”215 
He situates this identity within a paradoxical history that has its origins in 
pre-Islamic time and a complex geography whose map is continuously 
drawn and redrawn.216 To Kassir, history and especially geography have 
always been about political and economic struggles.217 And only if we 
understand how those historical paradoxes and geographical 
relationships led to contemporary problems can we attempt to overcome 
development problems of today. This teaches that we must foreground 
historical and geographical debates in order to begin to understand 
questions of law, development, and regionalism. 
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